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Tax Cannibalization by State Corporate Taxes: 
Revised Estimates
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
In 2016 and 2017, we published a series of 
three papers on what we called the “tax 
cannibalization” problem. We argued that our 
results from this research had profound 
implications for numerous debates about fiscal 
federalism in the United States — including the 
design of federal- and state-level taxes,1 questions 
about constitutional doctrines,2 and controversies 
regarding economic development tax incentives.3
To briefly summarize some of our key 
conclusions, we argued that state-level taxes on 
corporate income and on capital gains were 
generating large fiscal externalities that deprived 
the federal government of revenue. Indeed, we 
estimated that these fiscal externalities were so 
large that — at the margin — several states’ tax 
rates on corporate income and on capital gains 
were destroying more than a dollar of federal 
revenue per dollar raised for the state 
governments.
Yet soon after we published these striking 
results, the world of U.S. fiscal federalism 
changed rather dramatically. Among the most 
important of these changes,4 at the end of 2017 
Congress passed the most sweeping federal tax 
overhaul in more than 30 years.5 This new 
legislation, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, reduced the 
federal corporate income tax rate from 35 percent 
to 21 percent.
This raises the question: To what extent do our 
prior estimates for the tax cannibalization 
problem still apply post-2017? In this article we 
address that question, focusing on the 
implications of the reduced federal corporate 
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1
David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal 
Federalism in the United States,” 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 295 (2017).
2
Gamage and Shanske, “The Federal Government’s Power to Restrict 
State Taxation,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2016, p. 547.
3
Gamage and Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and State Government 
Tax Incentive Programs,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 17, 2016, p. 197.
4
Another important change was the Supreme Court’s decision in 
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). For some of our 
writings on the implications of this decision, in articles we coauthored 
with Adam Thimmesch, see “Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign 
Vendors,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 8, 2018, p. 111; “Wayfair: Sales Tax 
Formalism and Income Tax Nexus,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 3, 2018, p. 975; 
and “Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden,” State Tax Notes, 
July 30, 2018, p. 447.
5
For a critique of aspects of this tax overhaul that we coauthored with 
several other tax scholars, see “The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, 
Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation,” 103 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1439 (2019).
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income tax rate.6 We otherwise use the exact same 
method as in our 2017 article;7 this article departs 
from our 2017 calculations only by using the 
current corporate income tax rate of 21 percent in 
place of the prior rate of 35 percent. In a 
forthcoming article, we plan to discuss a further 
methodological question related to our use of 
statutory corporate income tax rates rather than 
effective corporate income tax rates, along with 
discussing policy implications of our revised 
estimates.
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to 
illustrate the essence of how federal-level 
corporate income tax rates relate to the tax 
cannibalization problem, through a simple 
example. Consider this from one of our earlier 
articles8:
The higher a state’s tax rate is on a shared 
base, say the corporate income tax base, 
the more revenue the federal government 
loses from the actions of taxpayers to 
avoid paying what is essentially a 
combined federal-state tax rate. Put more 
concretely, here is a very simple and 
simplified example. Suppose a 
corporation engages in additional profit 
shifting out of the United States because of 
the additional 8.84 percent corporate tax 
imposed by California. Say the 
corporation shields $1 million in 
additional profits and California thus 
loses $88,400 of tax revenue as a 
consequence. The federal fisc potentially 
loses $350,000, because the rate at the 
federal level is 35 percent. As the example 
illustrates, because the federal 
government levies much higher taxes on 
the shared bases of corporate and 
individual income than do any state 
governments, the federal government 
suffers most of the harm when state-level 
tax rates induce taxpayers to engage in 
additional distortionary behaviors that 
shrink the shared tax base.
How differently would this example play out 
today? Again, the key difference is that today’s 
federal corporate income tax rate has been 
reduced to 21 percent. Thus, if California’s 8.84 
percent corporate income tax rate were to induce 
a corporate taxpayer to shield an additional $1 
million in profits abroad, the federal fisc would 
potentially lose $210,000 of revenue as a result of 
that additional profit shifting under today’s 
federal corporate income tax rate.
As this simplified example suggests, the 
magnitude of the tax cannibalization problem 
from state corporate income taxes should be 
somewhat smaller in 2020, because of the reduced 
federal corporate income tax rate. However, the 
essential dynamics of the tax cannibalization 
problem should remain mostly the same, just with 
a smaller magnitude.
Revised Estimates for 2020
In our 2017 article, we explained our method 
for estimating the magnitude of the tax 
cannibalization problem and then reported 
results based on that method. Our bottom-line 
results for the magnitude of the avoidable 
economic waste from tax cannibalization caused 
by state corporate income taxes in 2017 was that 
— for most states9 — the marginal dollar raised 
through the states’ corporate income taxes (rather 
than through an alternative that did not involve 
use of a tax base shared with the federal 
government, such as state sales taxes) 
cannibalized “somewhere between $0.50 and 
$0.95 of net revenue” from the combination of the 
federal government and other states’ 
governments.10 As we further explained in that 
article, that marginal tax cannibalization 
represented economic waste that could have been 
prevented by raising marginal revenues through 
an alternative to state corporate income taxes.11
6
Federal capital gains tax rates were essentially left unchanged by the 
new legislation. The top federal ordinary income tax rate was reduced 
from 39.6 percent to 37 percent, but — in contrast to the reduction in the 
federal corporate tax rate — this change does not substantially affect our 
prior estimates of tax cannibalization.
7
Gamage and Shanske, “Fiscal Federalism,” supra note 1.
8
Gamage and Shanske, “Tax Incentive Programs,” supra note 3, at 
198.
9
The exceptions were the six states that do not levy corporate income 
taxes and Iowa, which levies a 12 percent corporate income tax, higher 
than in any other state, but with some unusual base-definition rules that 
make the analysis more complicated.
10
Gamage and Shanske, “Fiscal Federalism,” supra note 1, at 347.
11
Id. at 352-53.
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Using the exact same method as described in 
our 2017 article, but inputting the 2020 federal 
corporate income tax rate of 21 percent, reduces 
these estimates so that the marginal dollar raised 
through most states’ corporate income tax rates 
(rather than through an alternative that would not 
involve use of a tax base shared with the federal 
government) now generates somewhere between 
23 cents and 42 cents of avoidable economic waste 
from tax cannibalization.12 In other words, the 
magnitude of the tax cannibalization problem 
from state corporate income taxes has been 
reduced by slightly more than half.
This should not be too surprising. A primary 
justification for why Congress slashed the federal-
level corporate income tax rate in 2017 was the 
widespread view that cross-border tax planning 
had made the 35 percent federal rate 
unsustainable. Certainly, many tax experts argued 
that it would have been better to reform the 
corporate tax base to deter this cross-border tax 
planning rather than to slash the rate. But this 
does not change the reality that, absent 
comprehensive reforms to the corporate tax base, 
in many experts’ views, the federal-level 
corporate income tax rate was set unsustainably 
high in 2017. Accordingly, our research found that 
the incremental effect of additional state-level 
corporate income tax rates was generating 
massive amounts of economic waste through tax 
cannibalization in 2017.
That this problem has now been more than cut 
in half does not mean that the problem is now 
small. Avoidable economic waste of 23 cents to 42 
cents per marginal dollar raised is still huge 
compared to most other policy contexts in which 
economic waste could be prevented through 
relatively achievable policy changes.
Below is a revised version of “Table 1: 
Approximating Tax Cannibalization for 
Corporate Income Tax Rates” from our 2017 
article.13 Again, the method and inputs are all the 
same as in our 2017 article, except that the 2020 
federal corporate tax rate of 21 percent is used 
instead of the pre-2018 rate of 35 percent.
As in our 2017 article, the vertical axis shows 
the semi-elasticity input for vertical distortions 
(VD) — that is, the extent to which a state 
corporate income tax rate shrinks the combined 
federal and state corporate income tax base at the 
margin. Similarly, the horizontal axis shows the 
semi-elasticity input for horizontal distortions 
(HD) — that is, the extent to which a state 
corporate income tax rate induces economic 
activity to move to other U.S. states and thereby 
grows those other states’ tax bases at the margin.
As we explained in our 2017 article,14 we read 
the empirical literature as implying that the most 
plausible range of inputs for both VD and HD are 
probably somewhere between 2 and 3. We thus 
show results for a range of VD of between 2 and 3 
(and also 1 to show the implications of what we 
take to be an implausibly low-end measurement). 
For the reasons we explained in our 2017 article, 
we show a wider range of possible inputs for HD 
(but with 0 and 8 being shown to depict the 
implications of what we take to be an implausibly 
low-end and an implausibly high-end input, 
respectively).
12
A more thorough update of our prior analyses than the one we 
provide here would review the recent empirical literature to update the 
empirical estimates that our analyses rely on, rather than just updating 
the corporate income tax rate. We hope to return to this task in future 
work. But for present purposes, a thorough update of that sort is beyond 
the scope of this short article.
13
Gamage and Shanske, “Fiscal Federalism,” supra note 1, at 323. As 
in our prior article, “When the acting state’s tax rate exceeds the revenue-
maximizing level for the acting state . . . marginal tax cannibalization 
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Within each box, we then show four output 
estimates:
• First, “ActStRevMaxTR (%)” shows the state 
corporate income tax rate that would 
maximize tax revenue for the acting state’s 
government. In other words, hiking the tax 
rate above that level would deprive the 
acting state government of revenue (this 
level is sometimes referred to as the peak of 
the Laffer curve15). Any state government 
that cares about the welfare of its citizens 
should thus set its corporate tax rate below 
this level.
• Second, “NatRevMaxTR (%)” shows the 
state tax rate that would maximize revenues 
for all jurisdictions, including the acting 
state, the federal government, and other 
states’ governments. So long as tax 
cannibalization is positive, this number will 
be lower than the prior output 
measurement, because positive tax 
cannibalization means that the acting state’s 
tax rate is on net destroying other U.S. 
governments’ revenues. It is not necessarily 
irrational for a state government to set its tax 
rate above this level, because the state 
government may not care much about the 
impact of its tax policies on federal 
government revenue.
• Finally, “MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 
8.84%” and “MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate 
of 9.99%” show our tax cannibalization 
estimates for two states: California, which 
levies an 8.84 percent corporate tax rate, and 
Pennsylvania, which levies a 9.99 percent 
corporate tax rate.
Looking across what we take to be the most 
plausible range of estimates for both VD and HD 
from the prior empirical literature, (between 2 and 
3 for both measurements), the table shows that we 
estimate marginal tax cannibalization of between 
51 cents and $1.06 for California’s corporate 
Horizontal Distortions













1 100 50 33.3 25 20 11.1 ActStRevMaxTR (%)
79 41.7 29.3 23.1 19.3 12.7 NatRevMaxTR (%)
$0.23 $0.20 $0.17 $0.12 $0.06 -$0.69 MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 8.84%
$0.23 $0.21 $0.17 $0.13 $0.07 -$1.41 MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate of 9.99%
2 50 33.3 25 20 16.7 10 ActStRevMaxTR (%)
29 20.8 16.7 14.2 12.6 9.3 NatRevMaxTR (%)
$0.51 $0.51 $0.51 $0.52 $0.52 $0.59 MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 8.84%
$0.52 $0.54 $0.55 $0.58 $0.61 $68 MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate of 9.99%
2.5 40 28.6 22.2 18.2 15.4 9.5 ActStRevMaxTR (%)
19 14.8 12.5 11 10 7.9 NatRevMaxTR (%)
$0.67 $0.70 $0.73 $0.76 $0.82 $2.41 MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 8.84%
$0.70 $0.74 $0.79 $0.87 $1.00 N/A MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate of 9.99%
3 33.3 25 20 16.7 14.3 9.1 ActStRevMaxTR (%)
12.3 10.4 9.2 8.4 7.8 6.6 NatRevMaxTR (%)
$0.86 $0.91 $0.97 $1.06 $1.19 $10.07 MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 8.84%
$0.90 $0.98 $1.08 $1.24 $1.51 N/A MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate of 9.99%
15
Id. at 310.
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income tax rate, and of between 55 cents and $1.24 
for Pennsylvania’s corporate income tax rate.
Put another way, in 2020, California’s 
corporate income tax rate is likely destroying 
somewhere in the range of 51 cents to $1.06 of net 
revenues from other jurisdicitons per marginal 
tax dollar raised by California. And 
Pennsylvania’s corporate income tax rate is likely 
destroying somewhere in the range of 55 cents to 
$1.24 of net revenues from other jurisdictions per 
marginal tax dollar raised by Pennsylvania.
As we explained in our 2017 article,16 the 
estimates we report on the table are much higher 
than the bottom-line estimates for avoidable 
economic waste from tax cannibalization that we 
reported earlier. The reason is that the estimates in 
the table are too high, in a sense, because they do 
not take into account that the states would need to 
raise revenue in some other way and that other 
ways of raising revenue would also cause some 
economic waste. In short, raising revenue through 
state sales taxes, for example, would create 
incentives for business taxpayers to move their 
production activities out of state, so as to reduce 
their susceptibility to those sales taxes.17 But the 
marginal tax cannibalization generated by 
alternatives like state sales taxes is substantially 
less than the marginal tax cannibalization 
generated by state corporate income taxes that 
piggyback on the federal corporate income tax 
base. Our bottom-line estimates for the 
“avoidable economic waste” from the tax 
cannibalization caused by state corporate income 
taxes thus approximate the extent to which state 
corporate income taxes generate greater marginal 
economic waste than do alternatives.
This is why our bottom-line estimates for 
avoidable economic waste from tax 
cannibalization is between 23 cents and 42 cents 
on the margin, looking across most of the U.S. 
states.18 This is in contrast to a range like 51 cents 
to $1.06 resulting from considering California’s 
corporate income tax alone.
In summary, although the tax cannibalization 
generated by state corporate income taxes has 
been substantially reduced since 2017, we still 
consider our 2020 estimates to be rather large and 
striking. In a forthcoming follow-up article we 





State sales and use taxes typically apply to purchases of many 
business inputs by corporate taxpayers, especially when these purchases 
are intended for the corporate taxpayers’ use in the state.
18
See note 12 and accompanying text supra. Looking at California, 
our bottom-line estimate for avoidable economic waste in 2020 is 
between 35 cents and 41 cents per marginal dollar of revenue raised by 
the corporate income tax rate. Looking at Pennsylvania, our bottom-line 
estimate for avoidable economic waste in 2020 is between 40 cents and 42 
cents per marginal dollar of revenue raised by the corporate income tax 
rate.
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